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Abstract	21	 	22	 The	mitigation	hierarchy	is	a	decision-making	framework	designed	to	address	23	 impacts	on	biodiversity	and	ecosystem	services	through	first	seeking	to	avoid	24	 impacts	wherever	possible,	then	minimising	or	restoring	impacts,	and	finally	by	25	 offsetting	any	unavoidable	impacts.	Avoiding	impacts	is	seen	by	many	as	the	26	 most	certain	and	effective	way	of	managing	harm	to	biodiversity,	and	its	position	27	 as	the	first	stage	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	indicates	that	it	should	be	28	 prioritised	ahead	of	other	stages.	However,	despite	an	abundance	of	legislative	29	 and	voluntary	requirements,	there	is	often	a	failure	to	avoid	impacts.	We	discuss	30	 reasons	for	this	failure	and	outline	some	possible	solutions.	We	highlight	the	key	31	 roles	that	can	be	played	by	conservation	organisations	in	cultivating	political	32	 will,	holding	decision-makers	accountable	to	the	law,	improving	the	processes	of	33	 impact	assessment	and	avoidance,	building	capacity,	and	providing	technical	34	 knowledge.	A	renewed	focus	on	impact	avoidance	as	the	foundation	of	the	35	 mitigation	hierarchy	could	help	to	limit	the	impacts	on	biodiversity	of	large-scale	36	 developments	in	energy,	infrastructure,	agriculture	and	other	sectors.	37	 	38	 	39	 Words:	4846	40	 	41	 	42	43	
Introduction	44	 	45	 The	development	of	mines,	infrastructure,	buildings	and	plantations	changes	46	 landscapes	and	seascapes	profoundly,	putting	pressure	on	biodiversity	and	often	47	 reducing	the	provision	of	important	ecosystem	services.	The	mitigation	48	 hierarchy	is	a	decision-making	framework	developed	with	the	aim	of	preventing	49	 and	remediating	environmental	impacts	from	such	developments.	It	requires	50	 developers	to	first	avoid	impacts	where	possible.	Where	impact	avoidance	is	not	51	 possible,	developers	should	strive	to	minimise	impacts,	to	restore	affected	areas,	52	 and	finally,	to	offset	any	remaining	residual	impacts	(McKenney	&	Kiesecker,	53	 2010;	Clare	et	al.,	2011;	BBOP,	2012a;	Gardner	et	al.,	2013).	54	 	55	 The	first	part	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	–	impact	avoidance	–	requires	56	 developers	to	“anticipate	and	prevent	adverse	impacts	on	biodiversity	before	57	 actions	or	decisions	are	taken	that	could	lead	to	such	impacts”	(Ekstrom	et	al.,	58	 2015).	Impact	avoidance	is	typically	identified	as	the	most	important	stage	of	the	59	 mitigation	hierarchy	(McKenney	&	Kiesecker,	2010;	Clare	et	al.,	2011;	Ekstrom	et	60	 al.,	2015).	In	principle,	impact	avoidance	can	reduce	the	need	for	remediation,	61	 thus	side-stepping	problems	such	as	restoration	time	lags,	limits	to	what	can	be	62	 offset,	and	negative	social	implications	of	removing	people’s	access	to	nature	63	 locally	and	attempting	to	replace	it	elsewhere	(Bendor,	2009;	Maron	et	al.,	2010;	64	 Pilgrim,	Brownlie,	Ekstrom,	Gardner,	von	Hase,	ten	Kate,	Savy,	Stephens,	Temple,	65	 Treweek,	Ussher,	et	al.,	2013;	Ives	&	Bekessy,	2015).	66	 	67	 In	practice,	there	are	concerns	that	impact	avoidance	is	often	ignored,	68	 misunderstood	and	poorly	applied	by	developers,	impact	assessment	69	 practitioners	and	regulators	(Clare	et	al.,	2011;	Villarroya	et	al.,	2014).	At	the	70	 same	time,	there	are	signs	of	offsetting	being	situated	in	policy	as	a	means	to	71	 legitimise	development	which	would	not	otherwise	have	been	permitted	72	 (Walker	et	al.,	2009;	Ferreira	et	al.,	2014;	Sullivan	&	Hannis,	2015).	Situating	73	 offsets	as	a	“license	to	trash”	runs	counter	to	the	principle	of	avoiding	negative	74	 impacts	to	the	maximum	extent	practicable,	a	core	tenet	of	the	mitigation	75	 hierarchy	(US	EPA	and	DA,	1990;	McKenney	&	Kiesecker,	2010;	BBOP,	2012a).	76	 	77	 We	review	the	incentives	and	requirements	for	impact	avoidance,	identify	78	 challenges	for	achieving	it,	and	outline	some	possible	solutions,	with	an	79	 emphasis	on	the	ways	in	which	conservation	organisations	can	advocate	for	80	 better	impact	avoidance.	The	issues	discussed	here,	and	a	wider	range	of	case	81	 studies,	are	detailed	further	by	BirdLife	International	et	al.	(2015)	and	Ekstrom	82	 et	al.	(2015).	83	 	84	
Current	incentives,	requirements	and	criteria	for	impact	avoidance	85	 	86	 National	laws,	voluntary	sustainability	standards,	corporate	commitments	and	87	 pressure	from	civil	society	organisations	all	have	roles	to	play	in	creating	88	 incentives	and	requirements	for	impact	avoidance.	Most	countries	require	89	 impact	avoidance	to	be	considered	as	part	of	the	Environmental	and	Social	90	 Impact	Assessment	(ESIA)	process	(Pope	et	al.,	2013).	Sustainability	standards	91	 include	those	set	by	financial	institutions,	such	as	Performance	Standard	6	of	the	92	
International	Finance	Corporation,	as	well	as	sector-specific	standards	such	as	93	 those	of	the	Roundtable	on	Sustainable	Palm	Oil	(RSPO).	Companies	are	94	 increasingly	adopting	commitments	to	No	Net	Loss	(NNL)	or	Net	Positive	Impact	95	 (NPI),	which	seek	to	ensure	that	negative	impacts	on	biodiversity	and	ecosystem	96	 services	are	balanced	(for	NNL)	or	outweighed	(for	NPI)	by	impact	avoidance,	97	 minimisation,	restoration	and	offsetting	(Gardner	et	al.,	2013;	Rainey	et	al.,	98	 2015).		99	 	100	 In	Table	1,	we	summarise	some	of	the	key	components	(actions	and	criteria)	of	101	 standards	and	laws	requiring	avoidance,	for	a	set	of	illustrative	instruments.	102	 Commonly-required	actions	include	consultation,	impact	assessment,	103	 consideration	of	cumulative	impacts,	and	monitoring.	Consulting	with	local	104	 communities	and	conservation	organisations	is	an	important	step	in	identifying	105	 impacts	that	might	be	considered	serious	or	unacceptable,	and	which	might	106	 otherwise	go	un-assessed.	Conducting	an	ESIA	is	now	standard	practice	in	most	107	 countries	for	large	developments,	but	it	is	less	common	to	consider	the	108	 cumulative	impacts	of	multiple	developments,	including	offsite,	cryptic	and	109	 secondary	impacts	(Pope	et	al.,	2013;	Raiter	et	al.,	2014).	Transparent	long-term	110	 monitoring	and	evaluation	is	essential	for	demonstrating	that	commitments	to	111	 avoid	and	remediate	impacts	have	been	successfully	upheld.	112	 	113	 Our	examples	illustrate	four	recurrent	criteria	for	moving	past	the	avoidance	114	 stage	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy.	The	first	is	that	alternatives	are	given	full	115	 consideration	by	regulators	and	developers,	both	before	and	during	the	ESIA	116	 (Table	1).	These	can	include	a	“no-project”	alternative,	alternative	site	locations	117	 (spatial	impact	avoidance),	alternative	scheduling	of	activities	(temporal	impact	118	 avoidance),	and	use	of	technology	and	planning	within	a	site	(design-based	119	 impact	avoidance)	(Table	2).			120	 	121	 Early	consideration	of	alternatives	is	advisable,	alongside	early	engagement	with	122	 a	full	range	of	stakeholders	to	identify	appropriate	alternatives	(Ekstrom	et	al.,	123	 2015).	The	cost	of	altering	a	project	is	lower	early	in	the	planning	process,	before	124	 decisions	about	locations	and	technologies	are	locked	in	and	the	range	of	feasible	125	 alternatives	is	narrowed.	Planning	tools	can	facilitate	access	to	data	on	existing	126	 conservation	designations	and	thus	help	to	screen	alternative	sites,	such	as	the	127	 Integrated	Biodiversity	Assessment	Tool	(http://www.ibatforbusiness.org)	and	128	 national	land-use	planning	and	protected	area	databases.	129	 	130	 A	second	common	criterion	for	proceeding	past	the	avoidance	stage	is	that	the	131	 societal	benefits	of	a	project	should	outweigh	its	environmental	costs.	The	132	 European	Habitats	Directive	provides	some	of	the	clearest	guidance	here.	133	 Impacts	on	priority	habitats	and	species	are	only	permitted	for	reasons	of	human	134	 health,	public	safety,	environmental	benefit,	or	if	there	are	“imperative	reasons	135	 of	overriding	public	interest”	for	the	project	to	proceed	(Council	of	the	European	136	 Commission,	1992;	European	Commission,	2007).	Even	here,	however,	defining	137	 when	societal	benefits	are	sufficient	to	justify	environmental	harm	is	subjective	138	 and	often	highly	political,	a	challenge	explored	further	in	the	next	section.		139	 	140	
A	third	common	criterion	for	moving	past	avoidance	is	delivery	of	NNL	or	a	net	141	 gain	in	biodiversity	(BBOP,	2012a;	Gardner	et	al.,	2013).	NNL	is	typically	only	142	 assessed	for	priority	biodiversity	features	such	as	endangered	species,	Critical	143	 Habitat	and	areas	of	High	Conservation	Value,	even	though	it	might	be	most	144	 successfully	applied	to	common	species	and	ecosystems	(Pilgrim,	Brownlie,	145	 Ekstrom,	Gardner,	von	Hase,	ten	Kate,	Savy,	Stephens,	Temple,	Treweek,	&	146	 Ussher,	2013).	There	are	partial	exceptions:	the	UK	National	Planning	Policy	147	 Framework,	for	example,	covers	wider	biodiversity	in	addition	to	designated	148	 sites	(Department	for	Communities	and	Local	Government,	2012).	However,	the	149	 Framework’s	reliance	on	the	concept	of	“significant	harm”,	means	in	practice	150	 that	small,	cumulative	impacts	to	common	species	are	likely	to	be	ignored.	NNL	151	 obligations	can	often	be	met	through	a	promise	of	remediation	as	well	as	152	 through	impact	avoidance	and	minimisation	(BBOP,	2012b).	153	 	154	 Fourth,	legal	requirements	can	help	to	define	opportunities	for	impact	155	 avoidance,	such	as	through	identifying	protected	sites	and	species.	Laws	also	set	156	 requirements	for	planning	and	define	how	ESIA	should	be	carried	out,	and	where	157	 they	are	contravened,	they	provide	the	basis	for	conservation	organisations	to	158	 challenge	failures	to	avoid	impacts	in	the	courts.		159	
	160	
Challenges	for	effective	impact	avoidance	161	
	162	 We	surveyed	the	literature	and	drew	on	our	experiences	to	identify	challenges	163	 for	effective	impact	avoidance	in	five	broad	and	often	overlapping	categories:	164	 political	will,	regulation,	process,	capacity,	and	technical	knowledge	(Table	3).	165	 Political	will	refers	to	the	perceived	importance	among	decision-makers	of	166	 avoiding	impacts	on	biodiversity,	relative	to	other	concerns.	In	the	absence	of	167	 political	will,	laws	are	less	likely	to	be	enforced,	expensive	alternatives	are	more	168	 likely	to	be	ruled	“infeasible”,	and	legal	protection	is	at	risk	of	being	weakened	or	169	 corrupted	to	cater	for	powerful	private	interests.	Mascia	et	al.	(2014)	found	over	170	 500	cases	of	downgrading,	downsizing,	or	degazettement	of	protected	areas	in	171	 57	countries,	most	commonly	to	facilitate	industrial-scale	resource	extraction	172	 and	development.	For	companies	in	the	public	eye,	reputational	risk	is	an	173	 incentive	to	develop	the	political	will	to	ensure	that	impacts	are	reported	and	174	 avoided	(Dawkins	&	Fraas,	2010),	but	for	smaller	companies,	and	those	without	175	 shareholders	for	whom	environmental	issues	are	important,	it	may	not	be.	176	 	177	 The	effectiveness	of	regulation	depends	both	on	the	quality	of	legislation,	and	its	178	 implementation	in	practice.	In	Indonesia,	there	is	often	a	mismatch	between	179	 official	maps	and	the	physical	reality	of	landcover,	and	thus	it	can	be	easier	for	180	 oil	palm	companies	to	obtain	concessions	in	primary	forest	which	is	classified	as	181	 “nonforest	estate”	on	official	maps,	rather	than	in	the	millions	of	hectares	of	182	 degraded	land	which	–	because	it	is	mapped	as	“forest	estate”	–	is	legally	183	 unavailable	for	development	(Rosenbarger	et	al.,	2013).	This	is	a	failure	of	the	184	 legal	system	for	land	classification,	arising	perhaps	from	a	lack	of	political	will	to	185	 protect	primary	forests.	A	review	of	11	European	projects	affecting	sites	186	 protected	under	the	Habitats	Directive	found	consistent	failures	by	the	European	187	 Commission	in	the	interpretation	and	application	of	the	Directive	(Kramer,	188	 2009).	In	only	three	of	these	cases	were	alternative	locations	assessed,	as	189	
required	by	the	Directive,	and	in	few	if	any	cases	was	a	robust	argument	190	 established	for	the	project	being	of	“overriding	public	interest”	(for	further	191	 details	see	Kramer,	2009).	In	these	cases,	although	the	law	seems	to	provide	192	 strong	protection	in	principle,	it	appears	to	have	been	undermined	by	193	 interpretations	that	privileged	economic	development	and	marginalised	194	 environmental	protection.	In	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	mining	rights	195	 have	been	granted	within	protected	areas,	even	though	such	areas	are	legally	196	 protected	from	extractive	activities	(Javelle	&	Veit,	2012).	This	results	from	197	 contradictory	regulations,	inconsistent	and	outdated	government	information,	a	198	 lack	of	cooperation	between	the	two	relevant	ministries,	and	ultimately,	199	 opposing	interests.		200	 	201	 Even	while	acting	within	the	law,	regulators	and	companies	have	choices	about	202	 how	to	pursue	the	process	of	identifying	and	acting	on	opportunities	to	avoid	203	 impacts.	For	example,	if	impact	avoidance	is	not	considered	until	the	ESIA,	204	 opportunities	to	fundamentally	rethink	project	alternatives	may	no	longer	be	205	 available.	There	are	incentives,	for	those	who	would	benefit	from	a	project,	to	206	 ensure	that	“no-project”	alternatives	are	not	considered,	and	to	overlook	indirect	207	 and	cumulative	impacts.	Because	ESIA	and	standards	are	typically	applied	at	a	208	 project	rather	than	landscape	scale,	they	are	not	ideally	suited	to	identifying	209	 strategic	opportunities	for	impact	avoidance.	Within	standards,	requirements	210	 vary,	and	there	is	scope	for	criteria	such	as	those	for	identifying	High	211	 Conservation	Values	to	be	interpreted	differently	by	different	assessors	(Senior	212	 et	al.,	2015).	Responsibility	for	ensuring	permanent	protection	of	avoided	areas	213	 may	be	unclear:	areas	avoided	during	an	early	phase	may	be	demanded	in	later	214	 stages	of	a	project,	and	areas	avoided	by	one	company	may	not	be	avoided	by	215	 others.	For	example,	Sakhalin	Energy’s	avoidance	plans	(Table	2)	were	216	 undermined	by	Exxon’s	plans	to	conduct	seismic	surveys	in	the	same	area	217	 (Western	Grey	Whale	Advisory	Panel,	2015).	218	 	219	 Government	departments,	companies	and	civil	society	organisations	all	too	often	220	 lack	sufficient	capacity	and	resources	to	properly	understand,	develop	and	221	 implement	sound	environmental	policies	(Quétier	et	al.,	2014).	National	and	222	 local	governments	often	lack	(or	do	not	allocate)	sufficient	resources	to	audit	223	 compliance	with	legislation.	Small	and	medium-sized	companies	may	be	unable	224	 to	afford	in-house	expertise	on	biodiversity	and	the	mitigation	hierarchy.	225	 Effective	impact	avoidance	may	require	upfront	investments	in	assessment	and	226	 planning	at	a	time	when	there	may	be	uncertainty	about	whether	a	project	will	227	 proceed.	Even	large	companies	may	be	unwilling	to	incur	these	costs.	The	228	 influence	of	civil	society	organisations	may	be	limited	if	they	are	poorly-229	 resourced	and	have	limited	expertise,	as	is	common	with	local	groups.		230	 	231	 Although	knowledge	is	increasing,	there	are	still	many	gaps	in	technical	232	 understanding	of	the	spatial	distributions	and	population	status	of	species,	233	 especially	for	plants	and	invertebrates	(Pimm	et	al.,	2014).	This	makes	it	difficult	234	 to	identify	and	prioritise	the	sites	of	most	importance	in	advance	of	235	 developments.	Information	on	the	success	and	costs	of	restoration	and	offsetting	236	 efforts	is	also	sparse.	Unrealistic	assumptions	about	the	capacity	and	cost	of	237	 restoration	and	offsetting	could	result	in	promises	of	remediation	being	a	more	238	
attractive	option	for	companies	than	avoiding	impacts	early	in	the	project	cycle.	239	 A	further	challenge	is	that	there	may	be	trade-offs	between	impact	avoidance	240	 and	other	conservation	strategies.	For	example,	one	way	to	avoid	expanding	into	241	 natural	habitats	is	to	consolidate	timber	production,	farming	and	infrastructure	242	 in	existing	zones	or	corridors	of	disturbance.	There	is	widespread	evidence	that	243	 ‘sparing’	land	in	this	way	would	be	beneficial	for	many	wild	species,	even	if	it	244	 increases	the	per-hectare	impacts	of	development	(Edwards	et	al.,	2014;	245	 Balmford	et	al.,	2015;	Stott	et	al.,	2015).	However,	some	degree	of	‘sharing’	land	246	 with	multiple	uses	to	reduce	the	per-hectare	impacts	of	land	uses	is	also	247	 desirable,	and	clear	guidance	on	how	to	balance	these	strategies	is	not	available	248	 in	most	places.	249	 	250	
Confrontation	or	compromise?	251	 	252	 Conservation	organisations	have	strategic	choices	to	make	about	when	to	253	 collaborate	with	developers,	or	oppose	them.	Campaigning	against	harmful	254	 developments	is	important,	and	this	strategy	of	‘saying	no’	can	help	to	255	 counterbalance	the	ambit	claims	(extreme	initial	demands)	of	developers	256	 (Laurance,	2016).	Opposition	is	thus	an	important	conservation	strategy.		257	 	258	 Conservation	organisations	can	also	play	a	role	in	identifying	where	259	 developments	should	take	place.	A	key	problem	with	focusing	exclusively	on	260	 impact	avoidance	is	the	risk	of	leakage,	or	displacement	of	impacts.	Development	261	 avoided	at	one	location	is	likely	to	take	place	elsewhere.	Even	project	262	 cancellation	is	no	guarantee	that	impacts	have	been	avoided,	unless	regulation	263	 also	constrains	the	demand	drivers	incentivising	development.	Insofar	as	264	 development	is	driven	by	market	demands	for	minerals,	energy	and	other	265	 resources,	those	demands	will	continue	to	incentivise	further	development	266	 (Meyfroidt	et	al.,	2013).	Thus,	it	may	be	as	important	for	conservationists	to	get	267	 involved	in	defining	where	development	is	acceptable,	as	where	it	is	not	(Venter	268	 et	al.,	2013;	Dinerstein	et	al.,	2015).	Mapping	priority	areas	for	avoidance	often	269	 also	by	implication	identifies	locations	for	development	which	may	be	more	270	 appropriate	(Bright	et	al.,	2008;	Martin	et	al.,	2015).		271	 	272	 There	are	risks	involved	in	both	confrontational	and	collaborative	strategies.	As	273	 conservation	interests	are	typically	less	powerful	than	development	interests,	274	 opposition	might	leave	conservation	organisations	marginalised	and	without	275	 input	into	decisions.	On	the	other	hand,	too	much	willingness	to	compromise	276	 could	result	in	‘greenwash’,	conferring	an	image	of	environmental	responsibility	277	 on	companies	in	exchange	for	minimal	concessions	or	donations	(Robinson,	278	 2012).	The	best	strategy	will	be	context-dependent,	and	in	some	situations	a	279	 combination	of	principled	opposition	and	pragmatism	might	have	most	success.	280	 For	example,	conservation	organisations	engaged	with	local	and	national	281	 authorities	to	develop	standards	for	new	housing	developments	near	the	282	 Thames	Basin	Heaths	in	the	UK.	Disturbance-sensitive	bird	species	were	283	 protected	by	avoiding	construction	within	a	buffer	zone,	while	developers	were	284	 required	to	provide	dog-walking	areas	alongside	new	housing	nearby	to	285	 minimise	additional	disturbance	(BirdLife	International,	2015).		286	 	287	
Opportunities	for	more	effective	impact	avoidance	288	 	289	 There	are	multiple	ways	in	which	conservation	organisations	can	work	towards,	290	 and	support,	more	effective	impact	avoidance	(Table	3).	They	can	harness	and	291	 broadcast	public	support	for	conservation,	thus	creating	political	space	for	292	 decision-makers	who	want	to	support	impact	avoidance	(Downie,	2015)	and	293	 increasing	the	reputational	cost	on	those	who	ignore	it	(Ivanova,	2015).	When	294	 they	can	establish	or	promote	particular	ways	of	thinking	about	issues	(‘frames’),	295	 they	influence	the	extent	to	which	ecological	values	are	considered	in	policy	296	 development	(Sullivan	&	Hannis,	2015).	Conservation	organisations	could	also	297	 play	a	greater	role	in	challenging	corrupt	or	undemocratic	institutions	that	give	298	 private	or	political	interests	excessive	influence	(Greenwald	et	al.,	2012).	The	299	 success	of	high-profile	campaigns	in	persuading	companies	to	adopt	300	 sustainability	standards	and	zero-deforestation	commitments	shows	how	301	 corporate	policies	can	be	influenced	(Newton	et	al.,	2013;	Gibbs	et	al.,	2016).	302	 	303	 Regulation	can	be	improved,	both	in	the	letter	of	the	law	and	–	perhaps	more	304	 often	–	in	its	application.	Conservation	organisations	can	advocate	for	more	305	 stringent	requirements	for	impact	avoidance	and	clearly-defined	legal	protection	306	 for	sites	and	species.	They	can	also	campaign	against	subsidies	and	other	307	 perverse	incentives	for	development	in	areas	of	biodiversity	importance,	such	as	308	 the	proposal	by	Brazil	to	open	up	to	10%	of	its	strictly-protected	areas	to	mining	309	 (Ferreira	et	al.,	2014).	Conservation	organisations	could	also	campaign	to	extend	310	 stronger	protection	to	common	species	and	habitats,	which	are	sometimes	311	 overlooked	in	legislation	(Gaston,	2010).	Working	informally	with	state	agencies	312	 and	developers	might	be	fruitful:	Malcolm	and	Li	(2015)	suggest	that	informal	313	 dialogue	in	advance	of	submitting	project	proposals	may	have	helped	to	reduce	314	 the	number	of	proposals	submitted	in	the	United	States	that	would	put	315	 endangered	species	in	jeopardy.	316	 	317	 There	are	opportunities	for	conservation	organisations	to	hold	governments	and	318	 companies	accountable	to	the	processes	and	plans	they	have	signed	up	to.	They	319	 can	track	compliance	with	legislation	and	standards,	especially	in	jurisdictions	320	 where	there	is	limited	capacity	for	public	authorities	to	do	so.	They	can	also	push	321	 for	voluntary	actions	that	make	success	more	likely,	such	as	inclusion	of	indirect	322	 and	other	enigmatic	impacts	in	ESIA	and	genuine	consideration	of	“no-project”	323	 options.	Perhaps	the	most	important	demand	that	they	can	make	is	for	decision-324	 makers	to	consider	impact	avoidance	from	the	earliest	stages	of	the	planning	325	 process	(Ekstrom	et	al.,	2015).	Had	this	been	done	in	the	case	of	the	Via	Baltica,	326	 referenced	in	Table	2,	for	example,	the	case	might	not	have	gone	to	the	European	327	 Court	of	Justice	and	considerable	legal	costs	and	delays	could	have	been	avoided.	328	 	329	 Building	the	capacity	of	individuals	and	institutions	plays	a	pivotal	role	in	the	330	 success	of	conservation	efforts	(Brooks	et	al.,	2012).	Conservation	organisations	331	 can	support	the	development	of	biodiversity-inclusive	landscape	and	regional-332	 level	zoning	plans,	as	well	as	better	policy	guidance	material	to	support	the	333	 implementation	and	enforcement	of	legislation	on	impact	avoidance.	They	can	334	 contribute	to	developing	voluntary	or	regulatory	mechanisms	to	ensure	avoided	335	 areas	receive	long-term	protection	–	such	as	developing	new	legal	mechanisms	336	
for	permanently	retiring	grazing	leases	on	public	land	(Leshy	&	McUsic,	2009).	337	 They	have	also	played	an	important	role	in	the	development	of	voluntary	338	 standards,	and	will	continue	to	do	so.	For	example,	Greenpeace	played	a	key	part	339	 in	developing	a	methodology	for	identifying	areas	with	high	carbon	stocks	that	340	 should	be	avoided,	in	order	to	address	a	key	gap	in	the	RSPO	standard	for	oil	341	 palm	(Dinerstein	et	al.,	2015).		342	 	343	 Conservation	organisations	can	provide	tools	and	technical	data	to	make	it	easier	344	 to	conduct	cumulative,	strategic	and	environmental	impact	assessments.	345	 Examples	include	the	Biodiversity	Risks	and	Opportunities	Assessment	tool,	and	346	 the	Migratory	Soaring	Bird	Sensitivity	Map	(BirdLife	International,	2015).	347	 Conservation	organisations	can	work	with	other	civil	society	organisations	to	348	 understand	synergies	and	trade-offs	between	multiple	objectives,	and	find	349	 common	ground	in	advocating	for	impact	avoidance.	This	may	require	350	 understanding	complex	interactions	such	as	those	between	conservation	and	351	 other	human	interests.	It	may	also	involve	identifying	places	where	352	 developments	might	be	acceptable,	as	well	as	where	they	should	be	avoided.	A	353	 final,	crucial	role	is	in	better	evaluation	and	communication	of	the	success	(or	354	 otherwise)	of	efforts	to	avoid	impacts	(Baylis	et	al.,	2016).		355	 	356	
Conclusion	357	 	358	 We	suggest	that	a	renewed	focus	on	the	first	stage	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	359	 could	help	to	limit	the	biodiversity	impacts	of	large-scale	developments	in	360	 energy,	infrastructure,	agriculture	and	other	sectors.	Conservation	organisations	361	 play	an	important	role	in	cultivating	political	will,	holding	decision-makers	362	 accountable	to	the	law,	improving	the	processes	of	impact	assessment	and	363	 avoidance,	building	capacity,	and	providing	technical	knowledge.	Ensuring	that	364	 impact	avoidance	is	considered	as	early	as	possible	in	the	planning	process,	and	365	 that	it	is	placed	even	more	firmly	at	the	heart	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	in	both	366	 policy	and	practice	should	be	key	demands	on	their	agenda.		367	 	368	
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Table	1.	Examples	of	voluntary	standards	and	national	legislation	which	559	
set	requirements	for	impact	avoidance	by	defining	actions	and	criteria.	560	
Parentheses	indicate	cases	where	a	requirement	is	acknowledged	but	not	561	
clearly	defined.	562	 	563	
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Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme: 
Standard on Biodiversity Offsets (2012) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
    
✓ ✓ 
Cross Sector Biodiversity Initiative: A cross-
sector guide for implementing the Mitigation 
Hierarchy 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development: Performance Requirement 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
International Finance Corporation: Performance 
Standard 6* ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ 
World Bank: proposed Environmental and 
Social Standard 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ 
           
Le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
Australia: Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act, environmental 
offsets policy 
  
✓ 
  
(✓)   ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ 
British Columbia (Canada): Policy for Mitigating 
Impacts on Environmental Values (✓) ✓ ✓ (✓)   ✓ 
    
✓ 
European Union: Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, 
EIA Directive ✓ ✓ 
      
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
United Kingdom: National Planning Policy 
Framework 2012 ✓ ✓ ✓ 
    
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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*Requirements for consultation and impact assessment are established in IFC Performance Standard 1 565	566	
Table	2.	Different	types	of	impact	avoidance,	with	examples.	Inclusion	of	567	
projects	is	solely	to	illustrate	the	range	of	actions	that	can	be	taken	to	avoid	568	
impacts	on	biodiversity,	and	should	not	be	interpreted	as	endorsement,	569	
nor	as	a	suggestion	that	best	practice	was	necessarily	followed.	570	 	571	
Type	of	
impact	
avoidance	
Where	appropriate	 Example	 References	
No-project	 Irreplaceable	features	with	
no	viable	alternatives,	and	
where	offsets	unlikely	to	
succeed	
Development	permit	
refused	for	São	Luiz	do	
Tapajós	dam	in	Brazil	
(Vidal,	2016)	
Titanium	mine	in	
Cardamom	Mountains	of	
Cambodia	cancelled		
(Hance,	2011)	
Spatial	
avoidance	
Lower-impact	alternative	
locations	can	be	identified	
Site	for	desalination	plant	
in	Namibia	selected	to	
avoid	tern	colony	
(Aurecon	&	
SLR,	2015)	
Via	Baltica	road	re-routed	
to	avoid	Rospuda	Valley	
and	other	protected	sites	in	
Poland	
(Niedziałkowski	
et	al.,	2012)	
Temporal	
avoidance	
Time	periods	when	
activities	will	not	affect	
vulnerable	features	can	be	
identified	
Construction	and	seismic	
surveys	suspended	during	
breeding	season	of	Steller’s	
Sea	Eagles	and	seasonal	
presence	of	Gray	Whales	in	
Okhotsk	Sea,	Russia	
(Sakhalin	
Energy,	2009)	
Logging	activities	in	United	
States	scheduled	during	dry	
periods	to	avoid	erosion	
and	sediment	runoff	
(Bilby	et	al.,	
1989)	
Design-
based	
avoidance	
Technology	and	planning	
can	be	used	to	modify	
project	components	to	
avoid	specific	impacts		
Tunneling	equipment	used	
to	install	pipeline	
underground	below	
estuary	in	Ireland	
(Shell,	2014)	
Logging	operations	to	re-
use	old	access	roads	
instead	of	creating	new	
ones	in	Central	Africa	
(Kleinschroth	
et	al.,	2016)	
	572	573	
 574	
Table	3.	Reasons	for	the	failure	of	plans	and	policies	to	avoid	impacts	on	575	
biodiversity	and	ecosystem	services,	and	some	possible	solutions.	576	 	577	
	 Reason	for	failure	 Possible	solutions	
Po
lit
ic
al
	w
ill
	 Lack	of	political	will	to	support	impact	
avoidance	
Harness	and	broadcast	public	support	for	
conservation;	expose	conflicts	of	interest;	reform	
institutions	giving	private	interests	undue	influence	
Culture	within	planning	authorities	of	not	
valuing	biodiversity	
Make	biodiversity	education	mandatory	for	all	staff	of	
planning	authorities	
Re
gu
la
tio
n	
Legal	protection	insufficient	to	ensure	
impact	avoidance	
Incorporate	mitigation	hierarchy	principles	into	
legislation;	resist	efforts	to	weaken	legislation	
Ineffective	judicial	frameworks	for	holding	
decision	makers	to	account	
Make	full	use	of	those	judicial	frameworks	which	are	
effective;	lobbying	for	stronger	legislation	
Failure	to	avoid	impacts	to	biodiversity	
that	is	not	considered	"important"	
Set	avoidance	requirements	for	biodiversity	of	all	
kinds,	including	common	species	and	habitats	
Weak	requirements	for	restoration	and	
offsetting	make	remediation	more	
attractive	than	impact	avoidance	
Enforce	detailed,	stringent	requirements	for	
restoration	and	offsetting,	including	higher	bond	
requirements	and	penalties	for	failure	to	remediate	
Pr
oc
es
s	
Impact	avoidance	not	considered	until	
ESIA	
Make	early	stakeholder	engagement	the	industry	
norm;	assess	biodiversity	risks	before	ESIA	
Failure	to	anticipate	and	identify	likely	
impacts	
Audit	impact	assessments;	require	assessment	of	
indirect	and	cumulative	impacts	
"No-project"	option	not	considered	 Require	assessment	of	"no-project"	option	
Poor	communication	between	ecologists,	
engineers,	other	technical	consultants	
Require	direct	cooperation	between	consultant	
teams	as	part	of	ESIA	contract	
Failure	to	adhere	to	plans	 Hold	governments,	companies	accountable	to	plans	
Decision	to	proceed	is	made	on	basis	that	
remediation	will	compensate	for	impacts	
Separate	the	decision	to	proceed	from	any	
assessment	of	remediation	possibilities	
Ca
pa
ci
ty
	
Lack	of	resources	and	ecological	expertise	
within	planning	bodies		
Dedicate	resources	to	create	ecologist	roles	within	
planning	bodies;	improve	planner-ecologist	liaison	
Poor	coordination	between	conservation	
and	planning	authorities	
Provide	resources	to	integrate	conservation	planning	
into	local,	regional	and	national	land-use	planning	
Lack	of	permanent	protection	for	avoided	
areas	
Develop	voluntary	or	regulatory	mechanisms	to	
ensure	avoided	areas	receive	long-term	protection	
Te
ch
ni
ca
l	k
no
w
le
dg
e	
Biodiversity	data	inaccessible	or	difficult	
to	use	
Improve	data	availability	through	platforms	that	
increase	ease	of	use	by	non-specialists	
Important	biodiversity	not	prioritised	and	
identified	before	development	
Comprehensive	assessments	of	important	
biodiversity	at	local,	regional	and	national	levels	
Limited	understanding	of	trade-offs	 Incorporate	trade-off	analysis	into	ESIA	
Perception	that	impact	avoidance	is	too	
costly	
Neutral	analysis	of	costs	and	benefits	of	impact	
avoidance,	including	non-monetary	
Discounting	of	future	costs	relative	to	
costs	today	
Estimation	and	communication	of	future	costs	and	
limitations	of	restoration	and	offsetting	
Unrealistic	assumptions	about	technical	
capacity	to	restore	makes	remediation	
more	attractive	than	avoidance	
Collate	evidence	on	efficacy	of	restoration	and	
offsetting;	communicate	limits	of	remediation;	use	
offset	multipliers	commensurate	with	uncertainties		578	
